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1On January 22, 2009, President Obama signed an 
executive order to close the detention facilities in 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base within 12 months. 
A comprehensive plan for closing the camp should 
include a resettlement and reintegration program 
for detainees released from the facility since 2002. 
Our data indicate that social stigma, unemploy-
ment, and impairments to mental and physical 
health hinder eﬀ orts of former detainees to re-
establish their lives after release from custody.
 United States support for reintegration eﬀ orts is 
strategically and morally justiﬁ ed. Such eﬀ orts will 
(1) protect U.S. national security, (2) help repair the 
U.S. image abroad, (3) enable former detainees to 
lead productive lives, and (4) strengthen multilat-
eral cooperation to combat terrorism worldwide. 
WE PROPOSE THAT THE UNITED STATES:
» Design a resettlement and reintegration policy to 
minimize the social stigma experienced by former 
Guantánamo detainees. A case-by-case process 
should be implemented to enable former detain-
ees to clear their names and encourage commu-
nity members to assist released detainees as they 
reintegrate into their communities.
» Provide released detainees with immediate short-
term ﬁ nancial assistance and support for sustain-
able livelihoods. A comprehensive reintegration 
program should provide immediate assistance, 
as well as support detainees to secure sustain-
able employment and income for the long-term. 
Preparation for reentry into the job market
should begin before release. Job training and job-
 creation programs, such as small- and medium-
scale enterprise development initiatives, should 
also be a key part of the program and target
local labor markets. Such support should
aﬀ ord released detainees an opportunity to craft 
their own solutions to overcome the economic
challenges they face, and give them a sense of
autonomy and ownership in their reintegration. 
» Support the provision of mental and physical 
health services for released detainees who seek 
such assistance. Th ese services should be oﬀ ered 
in conjunction with other reintegration services, 
such as job training and family support. Th is
integrated approach should address the relation-
ship of economic hardships and mental health 
problems. 
» Ensure that reintegration programs are
developed and implemented in partnership with 
local communities. Local religious and civic
organizations should be involved in the design 
and implementation of reintegration programs 
to secure the legitimacy of reintegration eﬀ orts 
in the home countries of former detainees. Th e 
U.S. government should develop a comprehen-
sive resettlement and reintegration policy over-
seen by a high-level State Department oﬃ  cial. 
However, it may be appropriate for the United 
States to support in-country implementation 
through local independent nongovernmental 
organizations, with appropriate monitoring and 
oversight.
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Introduction
On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama 
signed an executive order to close the detention 
facilities in Guantánamo Bay within 12 months.¹ 
Th e order requires an immediate review of the 245
detainees still held in Guantánamo to determine 
whether they should be prosecuted, transferred, 
or released.² Upon issuing the order, President 
Obama said: “Th e message that we are sending the 
world is that the United States intends to prose-
cute the ongoing struggle against violence and ter-
rorism and we are going to do so vigilantly and we 
are going to do so eﬀ ectively and we are going to do 
so in a manner that is consistent with our values 
and our ideals.”³
 Closing Guantánamo is necessary to repair 
the U.S. image at home and abroad. But closure 
is only a ﬁ rst step toward that goal. Any compre-
hensive plan for closing the facility should also 
include a resettlement and reintegration program 
for released detainees either in their country of 
origin, the United States, or a third country. Th is 
paper outlines the elements of such a program and 
its rationale.
 To date, more than 525 of the approximately 
770 known detainees who have been held at 
Guantánamo since 2002—over 65% of the total 
population—have been released.⁴ Th e closure of 
Guantánamo will only increase this number. Avail-
able data suggest that few released detainees have 
received reintegration assistance from the United 
States, home governments, or private organiza-
tions.⁵
 Th e United States should play an active role 
in reintegration eﬀ orts. Support for such pro-
grams will (1) protect U.S. national security, (2)
help repair the U.S. image abroad, (3) enable for-
mer detainees to lead productive lives, and (4)
strengthen multilateral cooperation in the eﬀ ort 
to combat terrorism worldwide. “To truly achieve 
victory,” writes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
“the United States needs a military whose ability 
to kick down the door is matched by its ability to 
clean up the mess and even rebuild the house after-
ward.”⁶ A U.S.-supported resettlement and reinte-
gration program for former detainees is a crucial 
step in “rebuilding the house.”
 United States leadership on this issue is con-
sistent with—if not compelled by—this nation’s 
commitment to principles of fairness and humani-
tarianism. Th e available data indicate that the bat-
tleﬁ eld screening process used in Afghanistan to 
identify members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda was 
ﬂ awed from the start.
 As a result, many of the men transferred to 
Guantánamo were taken in error or never posed 
a serious threat to U.S. security. According to a 
Seton Hall report based entirely upon U.S. gov-
ernment documents, only 4 percent of the detain-
ees held in Guantánamo were ﬁ ghting at the time 
of their apprehension; moreover, only 5 percent of 
detainees at the camp were apprehended directly 
by the United States.⁷ Th e rest were captured by 
non-U.S. forces, including Pakistani and Afghan 
tribal militias and bounty hunters, in exchange for 
cash rewards paid by the United States.⁸ Contrary 
to longstanding law enforcement, intelligence, 
and previous military practice,⁹ the United States 
accepted uncorroborated allegations from these 
militias and bounty hunters, and failed to investi-
gate their claims about the detainees before clas-
sifying them as “enemy combatants”¹⁰ and sending 
them to Guantánamo and other detention facili-
ties.¹¹ 
 Indications that many detainees were not a seri-
ous threat to U.S. security began to surface in mid-
2002. In September of that year, just eight months 
after the ﬁ rst detainees arrived at Guantánamo, 
high-level U.S. oﬃ  cials were aware of concerns 
within military and intelligence circles about how 
few of those held at Guantánamo were actually 
dangerous Al Qaeda or Taliban members. At the 
same time, a senior CIA analyst with extensive 
Middle East experience reportedly concluded that 
only approximately one-third of the population—
at that time 200 of the 600 total detainees—had 
any connection to terrorism.¹² In 2003, an FBI 
counterterrorism expert told a committee of the 
National Security Council that there were at most 
50 detainees at Guantánamo worth holding.¹³
3 Despite this ﬂ awed screening process, the U.S. 
administration branded the detainees “the worst of 
the worst,”¹⁴ “bad people,”¹⁵ and “very tough, hard 
core, well-trained terrorists.”¹⁶ Th e U.S. adminis-
tration established new interrogation and detention 
procedures that departed sharply from interna-
tional law and time-honored military practices.¹⁷ 
Th e result was a diﬀ erent standard for detainee 
interrogation and treatment, which resulted in 
abuses of detainees that have been documented 
by government agencies¹⁸ and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs).¹⁹ Reported abuses include 
sleep deprivation, sexual humiliation, short-shack-
ling, forced exposure to extreme temperatures, 
sensory bombardment with loud music and strobe 
lights, as well as desecration of the Qur’an.²⁰
 While the treatment of detainees at Guantánamo 
has been documented in part,²¹ their fate since 
their release from Guantánamo is less well known. 
Yet reports to date are troubling. In November 
2008, UC Berkeley researchers released a study, 
Guantánamo and Its Aftermath: U.S. Detention and 
Interrogation Practices and Th eir Impact on For-
mer Detainees (hereafter “UC Berkeley Detainee 
Study”),²² based on interviews with 62 released 
detainees in nine countries who were held in U.S. 
custody in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay. Th e 
study examined the experiences of former detain-
ees in U.S. custody and the eﬀ ect of their incar-
ceration on their subsequent reintegration with 
their families and communities.²³ In addition to 
the UC Berkeley Detainee Study, reporters with 
the McClatchy Newspaper Company compiled a 
series of individual proﬁ les and articles about for-
mer detainees.²⁴ 
 In the preparation of this paper, we reviewed 
the UC Berkeley Detainee Study, the McClatchy 
proﬁ les, and a range of secondary sources, includ-
ing published newspaper reports on released 
Guantánamo detainees,²⁵ relevant documents 
released by the Department of Defense and other 
U.S. agencies, and research conducted by NGOs 
since September 11, 2001.²⁶
 We compared this information to the literature 
on reintegration and reentry eﬀ orts in three con-
texts: (1) prisoners released from United States 
prisons; (2) former combatants participating in 
structured disarmament, demobilization, and rein-
tegration (DDR) programs; and (3) prisoners of 
war (POWs). Each model oﬀ ers a useful frame-
work for conceptualizing an eﬀ ective reintegration 
plan for detainees released from Guantánamo.
 Th is policy paper has two limitations. First, we 
were unable to generalize from the data to the larger 
population of released detainees. Indeed, such gen-
eralization would require a much larger sample of 
former detainees and would need to employ quan-
titative as well as qualitative methods.²⁷ Second, we 
were unable to verify the veracity of the accounts 
reported in interviews with former detainees and 
key informants contained in the various reports. 
However, we found a high degree of consistency 
in the descriptions by former detainees of their 
imprisonment in Guantánamo and conditions upon 
returning to a country of origin or a third country, 
although such conditions did, in some cases, vary 
from country to country.
 Such limitations notwithstanding, the available 
data enables us to identify the need for a resettle-
ment and reintegration program and set out its key 
components.
Problems Faced Post-Release
Former detainees face three primary obstacles as 
they return to civilian life: (1) social stigma, (2)
diﬃ  culty ﬁ nding employment, and (3) mental and 
physical health problems.²⁸ Th ese challenges are 
not unique to former Guantánamo detainees; his-
torically, individuals returning home after periods 
of incarceration, exile, or war have faced similar 
problems. For those returning to civilian life after 
periods of captivity, the moment of release can be 
enormously diﬃ  cult.²⁹
 Researchers have found that “lengthy exposure 
to the harsh, impersonal conditions” of conﬁ nement 
aﬀ ects “an individual’s ability to readjust to life out-
side” of that conﬁ nement, and that, “[u]ndoubtedly, 
ex-prisoners are changed in some way by their time 
in prison.”³⁰ A 2003 study by the Center for Con-
ﬂ ict Resolution on the lives of former combatants 
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in postconﬂ ict zones found that 66 percent of those 
interviewed were unemployed, with a third suf-
fering psychological problems.³¹ In the context of 
child soldiers in Afghanistan, one report suggests 
that “[m]ost are likely suﬀ ering from psychological 
traumas and have been deprived of opportunities 
for education and civilian work.”³² Reintegration 
programs for former combatants seek to address 
the complex nature of their return through a 
focus on “[c]apacity building and life skills, as well 
as dealing with the psychological residue of the
conﬂ ict.”³³ 
SOCIAL STIGMA
Social psychologists Jennifer Crocker, Brenda 
Major, and Claude Steele describe the eﬀ ects of 
social stigma: when “social identity or member-
ship in some social category calls into question [a 
person’s] full humanity,” then that person becomes 
“devalued, spoiled, or ﬂ awed in the eyes of others.”³⁴ 
Vulnerable groups, particularly those involved in 
conﬂ ict or crime, often face stigmatization. Many 
former combatants may be stigmatized by the 
communities where they resettle due to their for-
mer combatant status, regardless of whether this 
community was their home before or during the 
conﬂ ict.³⁵
 Similarly, former inmates face stigmatization. A 
2008 study of the attitudes of released prisoners 
in the United States revealed that most expected 
to be labeled “ex-cons” and treated as failures and 
pariahs.³⁶ Th e study also found that even if a for-
mer inmate was not actually devalued in the eyes of 
others, his or her self-perception was signiﬁ cantly 
diminished because of the fear of being stigmatized 
and treated diﬀ erently.³⁷
 Many former Guantánamo detainees report 
feeling stigmatized as a result of their detention 
and have diﬃ  culty reintegrating into their com-
munities. Detainees leave Guantánamo with-
out having been convicted of a crime but also 
without oﬃ  cial exoneration. Th e UC Berkeley 
Detainee Study found that  communities often 
viewed former detainees as dangerous and a 
threat to public safety.³⁸ Th is stigmatization lim-
ited their ability to secure employment. Several
former detainees said this stigma would be lifted if 
they had the opportunity to clear their names.³⁹
 Th e relationship between social stigma and 
employment is dramatic. POWs in past wars have 
sometimes found it diﬃ  cult to secure employ-
ment, either because employers view them as too 
battle-scarred to hold a job or because within those 
societies POWs are considered a national disgrace 
since they were captured rather than killed hon-
orably in battle.⁴⁰ In the context of U.S. prisons, 
a study found that ﬁ rst-time conviction in the 
United States signiﬁ cantly lowers the probability 
of former prisoners securing employment and gen-
erating income after release.⁴¹
 Former Guantánamo detainees report facing 
similar challenges. Th ey report that employers 
refuse to hire them upon learning that they have 
spent time in Guantánamo.⁴² One former detainee 
reported that when he went to seek a job, he was 
refused employment because he was presumed to 
be “a dangerous person.”⁴³ In other cases, former 
detainees who had worked for their home govern-
ments prior to their capture were unable to return 
to their former positions.
 One former detainee explained that home gov-
ernments “[do] not oﬀ er us any jobs because of 
the accusation imposed by Americans on us. Th e 
government authorities think we are terrorists.”⁴⁴ 
Inability to obtain employment with a home gov-
ernment may further exacerbate social stigma by 
suggesting to the community that a former detainee 
has been determined dangerous by the authorities. 
In other words, if the state or the municipality will 
not employ a former detainee, why should a private 
business-owner?
 Social stigmatization may also aﬀ ect the mental 
well-being of former Guantánamo detainees. Socio-
logists have long understood that social integra-
tion improves mental well-being.⁴⁵ In addition to 
protecting an individual from psychological harm, 
social integration has the “ability … to improve men-
tal health by fulﬁ lling a number of essential needs, 
both emotional and material.”⁴⁶ However, many 
former Guantánamo detainees report receiving a 
mixed reception upon their return. One detainee 
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a dangerous person, even though he had no history 
of violence. Echoing similar sentiments, a former 
detainee said he no longer felt comfortable walking 
alone because of the way people in his community 
stared at him. Other former detainees reported 
trouble reestablishing social ties and that these 
fractured relationships led to further social exclu-
sion. In the words of one detainee: 
Old friends, old circles, they are even afraid of 
greeting me because they think then they may 
also be taken under custody or interrogated…. 
Guantánamo was of short duration. It was only 
two years. I left Guantánamo at age 23. But it 
put my life in distress until the end of my life. 
Th is is a bad trade.⁴⁷ 
LOSS OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
Economic stability is a crucial aspect of any suc-
cessful reintegration program.⁴⁸ For example, repa-
triated POWs and demobilized combatants often 
face barriers reentering civil society due to their 
extended absence from the job force.⁴⁹ In the U.S. 
prison context, most inmates released have no sav-
ings, no immediate entitlement to unemployment 
beneﬁ ts, and bleak job prospects. Inadequate skills, 
stigma of incarceration, and reentry into commu-
nities already struggling with low employment 
rates make economic suﬃ  ciency a major challenge 
to successful reintegration of former prisoners.⁵⁰
 Many former Guantánamo detainees, too, con-
front these issues as they try to ﬁ nd work after their 
release from detention. Only six of the 62 former 
detainees interviewed in the UC Berkeley Detainee 
Study had found permanent employment.⁵¹ One 
former detainee explained: “It’s impossible to get 
proper employment. We can only work freelance 
… but it is, for us, impossible to get a regular job.”⁵² 
Another respondent said he could not ﬁ nd any 
work that felt meaningful: “I am just breaking the 
stones on the roads for … less than two, three dol-
lars a day.”⁵³
 Others who did manage to ﬁ nd work could 
not always secure consistent employment or 
a job that was comparable to what they had 
held prior to their detention at Guantánamo.⁵⁴ 
One former detainee, a health care professional, 
complained that Guantánamo had tarnished 
his professional reputation and made it impos-
sible for him to resume his former career.⁵⁵
Several former detainees expressed disappointment 
about their job prospects. “For me and my fam-
ily,” one former detainee said, “the greatest need is 
ﬁ nancial because as a man, and a son, and a father, I 
should support my family right now.”⁵⁶
 Many families have experienced ﬁ nancial trou-
bles and incurred signiﬁ cant debt because of the 
absence of the primary wage earner.⁵⁷ One former 
detainee said that in his absence, his children were 
forced to borrow money to buy food.⁵⁸ Several 
detainees reported that their children had dropped 
out of school because they could not aﬀ ord fees. 
One said his sons “quit their education because of 
me, and now they’re going to be illiterate.”⁵⁹
 Eleven Afghan respondents in the UC Berke-
ley Detainee Study said their families were forced 
to sell property, borrow money, or quit their jobs 
in order to ﬁ nance eﬀ orts to secure their release. 
Five of the Afghan respondents said their relatives 
had paid bribes to corrupt oﬃ  cials or others who 
deceived them. “My family spent a lot of money 
looking for me and my shop was destroyed…. Our 
family borrowed a lot of money from relatives and 
other colleagues and there was just such a big debt 
and loan,” one former detainee said.”⁶⁰
 Paying back these debts has proved diﬃ  cult.⁶¹ 
Economic struggles have in many cases reshaped 
the lives and the futures of these men and their 
families. As one former detainee explained: “It’s a 
simple life, actually. I don’t have any job. Th ere’s no 
land now. Th ere’s no house now. And I’ve got such a 
big family, and there is no [one] responsible for my 
family. I don’t know what to do.”⁶²
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH
Harvard psychiatrist Judith Herman notes that 
“people who have endured horrible events suf-
fer predictable psychological harm.”⁶³ Th e harsh 
conditions of conﬁ nement and interrogation in 
Guantánamo appear to have taken a toll on the 
psychological health of many former detainees. 
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While there has been considerable focus on iso-
lated incidents of egregious abuse,⁶⁴ relatively little 
attention has been paid to the cumulative impact of 
conditions on former Guantánamo detainees.
 As Dr. Hernán Reyes of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross notes, psychological meth-
ods used in interrogations against the “‘background 
environment’ of harassment and duress” over long 
periods of time create a “cumulative eﬀ ect” that can 
be a part of “a system of psychological torture.”⁶⁵ 
According to the Manual on Eﬀ ective Investigation 
and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
commonly known as the Istanbul Protocol: 
A method-listing approach [of torture meth-
ods] may be counter productive, as the entire 
clinical picture produced by torture is much 
more than the simple sum of lesions pro-
duced by [individual] methods on a list. Th us, 
solitary conﬁ nement, detention in small or 
overcrowded cells, exposure to extremes in 
temperature and deprivation of normal sen-
sory stimulation are some torture methods 
whose cumulative eﬀ ects over a period of 
time should be considered.⁶⁶
 Stuart Grassian, a psychiatrist who has studied 
the psychiatric eﬀ ects of stringent conditions of 
solitary conﬁ nement, has found that such treat-
ment can have profound eﬀ ects on mental func-
tioning and can cause long-term psychological and 
physical damage.⁶⁷ Grassian notes that mental 
disturbances can include “an agitated confusional 
state, characteristics of a ﬂ orid delirium, [with] 
severe paranoid and hallucinatory features and also 
by intense agitation and random impulsive, often 
self-directed violence.”⁶⁸ Additional research con-
ducted by the National Institute of Mental Health 
also demonstrated “the link between captivity mal-
treatment and persistent psychiatric disorders.”⁶⁹
 Several studies suggest that compromised psy-
chological health impedes the reintegration of 
former POWs and released inmates from U.S. 
prisons.⁷⁰ In some cases, former POWs have expe-
rienced severe depression, substance abuse, vio-
lence, “emotional detachment from loved ones,” and 
“extreme suspicion of others.”⁷¹ One study showed 
that nine out of 10 American POWs returning 
from Korea were still experiencing Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) even 30 years after their 
release from Korean detention.⁷² Former inmates 
of U.S. prisons also suﬀ er from PTSD, depression, 
and other mental health conditions at rates dispro-
portionate to those of the general population.⁷³ 
Consequently, they often need targeted psycho-
logical services upon release.⁷⁴
 When asked about the most signiﬁ cant prob-
lems they have faced since their release from 
Guantánamo, many former detainees in the UC 
Berkeley Detainee Study said health problems 
were nearly of equal concern as ﬁ nancial troubles.⁷⁵ 
Many of these detainees reported facing a range of 
health problems, including wrist and knee pain to 
psychological conditions such as increased anger 
and agitation.⁷⁶
 Detainees attributed these problems directly to 
their detention and treatment in Guantánamo. One 
respondent received a diagnosis of PTSD from a
psychiatrist.⁷⁷ Another said he now suﬀ ered from 
sleeplessness, insomnia, and depression—none 
of which he experienced before his detention at 
Guantánamo.⁷⁸ Some detainees also reported 
recurring nightmares because of their detention 
in Guantánamo. One respondent said: “I real-
ized that I didn’t return to this life as intact as I 
thought I had.”⁷⁹ Another said he was still haunted 
by Guantánamo: “I think I’m still back there, with 
chains and people swearing at me.”⁸⁰ 
 Many former detainees in the UC Berkeley 
Detainee Study also reported feeling detached, 
lonely, closed oﬀ  from the world, and irritable as 
a result of their time in Guantánamo.⁸¹ One for-
mer detainee said: “I lost my appetite, [feel] frus-
trated, distressed, and lose my temper easily. I even 
felt like it was better when I was in Guantánamo, 
because there I didn’t hear anything.” He ﬁ nds 
himself unable and unwilling to interact with his 
family.⁸² Another former detainee said that after 
leaving Guantánamo, he developed “a new form 
of aggression towards other people, which I never 
had before.”⁸³
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health problems as well. Some in the UC Berke-
ley Detainee Study reported a range of physi-
cal impairments, including recurring headaches, 
trouble seeing clearly, fatigue or generalized dete-
rioration, and pain in the wrists, knees, back, and 
ankles, all of which they attributed to their treat-
ment in U.S. detention, including prolonged short 
shackling, hanging, or stress positions.⁸⁴
 Th ese physical eﬀ ects are unsurprising. Stud-
ies of former POWs document that stressors in 
captivity, including isolation, loss of freedom, mal-
nourishment, disease, and torture, have been linked 
to short- and long-term speciﬁ c health problems, 
including cardiovascular disease and hypertension 
and gastrointestinal disorders.⁸⁵ In the U.S. prison 
context, psychologist Craig Haney, an expert on 
the psychological eﬀ ects of living in prison envi-
ronments, has shown the consequences of long-
term solitary-like conﬁ nement on prison inmates 
to include anxiety, panic attacks, and general dete-
rioration of physical health.⁸⁶ Similarly, Judith 
Herman has found that “chronically traumatized” 
individuals may complain “not only of insom-
nia and agitation” but also of physical symptoms 
such as “tension headaches, gastrointestinal distur-
bances, and abdominal, back, or pelvic pain.”⁸⁷
 Th e health conditions reported by former detain-
ees suggest the interconnected nature of the prob-
lems they face post-release: Guantánamo stigma 
hurts their job prospects; unemployment means 
they are unable to provide for their families, which 
may contribute to vulnerability to depression and 
social exclusion. Former detainees may be unable 
to aﬀ ord medical care to manage psychological or 
physical ailments and these ailments prevent them 
from ﬁ nding or keeping a job. As one respondent 
in the UC Berkeley Detainee Study explained:
I had a family. I had a house. I had a car. I had 
a job…. I was making good money. Everything 
was going well, and now I don’t have the pa-
tience for anything…. I have problems with my 
physical self. I have aches in my body and my 
legs…. [My] life is a lot harder.⁸⁸ 
Discussion
Th e data suggest that a signiﬁ cant number of former 
Guantánamo detainees face signiﬁ cant challenges 
as they return to their home countries or resettle in 
third countries. Th ese detainees have been unable 
to leave behind Guantánamo completely; their 
experience in detention has limited their daily lives 
and curtailed their future opportunities. In the UC 
Berkeley Detainee Study, researchers reported that 
“most if not all” interviewees expressed “the sense 
that the legacy of Guantánamo remained.”⁸⁹
 While further studies are necessary to under-
stand fully the challenges facing released detain-
ees, available data justify the need for the United 
States to develop a comprehensive, country-speciﬁ c 
reintegration policy for former detainees to reduce 
social stigma, provide support for sustainable eco-
nomic livelihoods, and make mental and physical 
health services available to those who desire it.
SOCIAL STIGMA
Th e stigmatization of former detainees can be 
reduced by increasing the degree of interaction 
other community members have with such individ-
uals.⁹⁰ Th e chance for POWs to tell their stories to 
their communities has also been beneﬁ cial for those 
returning home from captivity to clarify what hap-
pened to them during their time away.⁹¹ Historical 
research of POW experiences, particularly in West 
Germany and Japan after World War II, suggests 
that such public acknowledgment can be crucial for 
full reintegration into society.⁹² Similarly, in Sierra 
Leone’s DDR eﬀ orts, traditional cleansing and 
healing ceremonies and religious support helped to 
remove some of the barriers associated with stigma 
of former combatants in that country’s civil war.⁹³
 Social reintegration eﬀ orts should draw on local
resources. Local religious and community-based 
organizations have helped sensitize local commu-
nities to the stigma former combatants face during 
DDR processes in post-conﬂ ict societies.⁹⁴ Com-
munity involvement of civic and religious groups in 
reintegration eﬀ orts has proved eﬀ ective in numer-
ous DDR programs seeking to reintegrate ex-com-
batants in post-conﬂ ict zones.⁹⁵
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 Reintegration programs in Nicaragua and 
Mozambique, for example, have successfully 
fostered community support through veterans
associations in order to address the post-conﬂ ict 
needs of former soldiers seeking to readjust to civil
society. Th e network of veterans in these countries 
provided support for social reintegration of for-
mer combatants, oﬀ ering them counsel and advice 
about postwar life.⁹⁶
 Th e involvement of similar associations may 
prove eﬀ ective in delivering assistance to for-
mer detainees in their communities. However,
reintegration programs should not further single 
out released detainees from other members of 
their community by giving them obvious beneﬁ ts 
that the rest of the community does not enjoy. 
Such practices have led to increased tensions in 
some instances.⁹⁷
 In addition, the opportunity for released detain-
ees to “clear their names” through an eﬃ  cient,
individual process is critical. Released prisoners 
in the United States who are publicly certiﬁ ed as 
rehabilitated or recognized as having shown good 
conduct experience improved job prospects and 
face less hostility in society.⁹⁸ A similar process 
to provide oﬃ  cial acknowledgment that released 
detainees pose no security threat or were wrongly 
detained will help them lift the Guantánamo 
stigma that now shadows them. 
ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION
Most reentry models promote economic rein-
tegration of participants and provide ﬁ nancial 
assistance to support short-term needs in the post-
release period.⁹⁹ DDR programs include assistance 
with immediate needs of former combatants and 
can include transitional safety allowances, food, 
clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term edu-
cation, training, employment, and tools. Th is phase 
of reinsertion can last up to one year.¹⁰⁰
 Released POWs in Germany also received 
federal funds apart from normal veterans-beneﬁ t 
packages because they had been away for years; 
these funds included lump-sum cash payments.¹⁰¹ 
Many released Guantánamo detainees would 
greatly beneﬁ t from some form of immediate assis-
tance to provide urgent ﬁ nancial support to their 
families, as well as give them an opportunity to 
transition back to the job force after being away for 
many years.
 Immediate ﬁ nancial assistance should be cou-
pled with a longer-term focus on securing stable 
employment. In U.S. prisons, this eﬀ ort often 
begins the moment an inmate enters the prison 
system, and continues through various stages of his 
or her reentry process after release. Phased reen-
try, beginning with job training courses in prisons 
and continuing with local and charitable initiatives 
aimed at providing transitional jobs for former 
prisoners increase employment opportunities for 
those released.¹⁰² DDR programs include a simi-
lar reentry process, and while implemented locally 
often necessitate long-term national assistance.¹⁰³ 
 Microﬁ nance programs have also been part of 
a number of DDR eﬀ orts, including Kosovo’s suc-
cessful agricultural enterprise plans.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, 
POWs repatriated to West Germany received 
loans for starting new businesses.¹⁰⁵ Several of the 
released detainees interviewed in the UC Berke-
ley Detainee Study faced diﬃ  culties reestablish-
ing their livelihoods because of increased debt. 
Making capital available to released detainees may 
prove eﬀ ective in promoting economic sustainabil-
ity within this population.
PROVISION OF HEALTH SERVICES
Th e interviews of former detainees conducted 
for the UC Berkeley Detainee Study point to the 
need for diagnosis and treatment of mental and 
physical conditions that detainees have faced as a 
result of their experiences in Guantánamo. Many 
former detainees will need support to reestablish 
trust with their families and social ties, address the 
impact of their absence from their families, and 
treat any symptoms of PTSD.
 In the past, returning POWs have commonly 
received diagnoses of severe depression, substance 
abuse, violence, “emotional detachment from loved 
ones, [and] extreme suspicion of others.”¹⁰⁶ Pro-
grams targeting the rehabilitation of POWs have 
9shown that service providers must recognize the 
unique medical and psychological conditions that 
POW returnees may suﬀ er upon reentry, particu-
larly with regard to PTSD. 
 Other reentry models have focused on provid-
ing mental and physical health services in conjunc-
tion with other reintegration services, such as job 
training and family support. Th e DDR models, 
for instance, show that successful reintegration 
have traditionally included activities that have 
(1) strengthened an individual’s coping skills for 
anticipated trauma and grief, (2) instilled a sense 
of social responsibility, and (3) promoted self-
regulation and security-seeking behavior. Th ese 
reintegration programs have thus emphasized the 
health needs of a former combatant by addressing 
the relationship of economic hardships and mental 
health problems. 
 Prisoners released from domestic U.S. prisons 
who have been exonerated from their crimes nev-
ertheless face health problems associated with their 
conﬁ nement. Th eir experience is instructive in the 
context of released Guantánamo detainees. Th ose 
who have been incarcerated for crimes they commit-
ted can begin to fashion a life narrative of redemp-
tion. In contrast, those who have been wrongfully 
convicted cannot do so and contend with the nega-
tive psychological consequences of conﬁ nement, 
according to psychologist Craig Haney.¹⁰⁷ Many 
individuals released from prison after serving time 
on wrongful convictions need immediate assistance 
upon release in the form of counseling, recognition 
for the wrongful conviction, and validation of feel-
ings of anger and distrust of the criminal justice 
system.¹⁰⁸ Haney notes that “the complexity of the 
transition from prison to home needs to be fully 
appreciated.”¹⁰⁹ Provision of health services for 
released detainees should be available and tailored 
to their unique circumstances.
Policy Rationales for U.S. Support
U.S. support for reintegration of former detain-
ees will promote U.S. foreign policy and national 
security interests. It will help repair the United 
States’ tarnished image abroad resulting from 
Guantánamo, prevent future crimes, and initiate a 
paradigm shift in our counterterrorism eﬀ orts by 
working more collaboratively with other countries.
 Further, regardless of whether the United States 
has a legal duty to assist former detainees to rebuild 
their lives, it has a moral duty to do so. Th e United 
States has held former detainees for years, convicted 
them of no crime, cut them oﬀ  from their families 
and the world, and in many cases subjected them to 
cruel and inhumane treatment, if not torture. Evi-
dence indicates that many of these men—farmers, 
goat-herders, laborers—were simply in the wrong 
place at the wrong time and should not have been 
detained.¹¹⁰
 Th e United States should now help them rein-
tegrate into their communities. And if the moral 
rationale for a U.S.-supported reintegration plan is 
compelling, the national security and foreign policy 
rationales for are equally strong.
REPAIRING THE U.S. REPUTATION
Many U.S. military and intelligence personnel 
have expressed concern about the negative impact 
of Guantánamo on America’s image abroad. At 
his conﬁ rmation hearing to become Director of 
National Intelligence, Admiral Dennis C. Blair 
(Ret.) said Guantánamo was “a damaging symbol 
to the world.”¹¹¹ Even before President Obama 
took oﬃ  ce, Bush administration oﬃ  cials and for-
mer oﬃ  cials recognized that Guantánamo has 
diminished America’s international stature.¹¹²
 A U.S. reintegration policy for released 
Guantánamo detainees will begin to repair this 
damage and restore the nation’s international repu-
tation. Reintegration can serve an important sym-
bolic function: a set of well-designed, U.S.-backed 
reintegration programs can be seen as a break from 
the past and a new symbol for American justice. 
By demonstrating the principles of humane treat-
ment of those who have not been convicted of any 
wrongdoing, a reintegration program would signal 
the new administration’s commitment to justice, 
human rights, transparency, and the rule of law.
POLICY RATIONALES FOR U.S. SUPPORT
RETURNING HOME
10
PREVENTING FUTURE TERRORISM
Th ere is a prevalent concern that detainees released 
from Guantánamo will become terrorists, either 
because of their desire to “return to the battle-
ﬁ eld” or—if they were not involved with violence 
prior to detention—because their experience at 
Guantánamo radicalized them.¹¹³
 Th e data on former Guantánamo detainees tak-
ing up arms against the United States are unclear. 
Statistics released by the Department of Defense 
have been imprecise. On January 13, 2009, Penta-
gon spokesman Geoﬀ  Morrell stated that 61 for-
mer detainees “appear to have returned to terrorism 
since their release from custody.”¹¹⁴ However, he 
added that 18 former detainees were conﬁ rmed as 
“returning to the ﬁ ght” and 43 were suspected of 
having done so in a report issued late in December 
by the Defense Intelligence Agency.¹¹⁵
 Morrell declined to give details, such as the iden-
tity of the former detainees, why and where they 
were released, and what actions they had taken 
since leaving U.S. custody.¹¹⁶ Th e government 
has not provided suﬃ  cient information to enable 
independent veriﬁ cation; as a result, researchers at 
Seton Hall have forcefully challenged these ﬁ gures 
as unreliable.¹¹⁷
 In the past when the government has released 
information on Guantánamo recidivism rates, 
independent researchers have challenged the 
data.¹¹⁸ Although the Department of Defense at 
one point publicly stated that “just short of thirty” 
former Guantánamo detainees have “returned” to 
the battleﬁ eld,¹¹⁹ the Department subsequently 
retreated from this number.¹²⁰ In 2007, the Depart-
ment released the names of detainees who had 
engaged in militant terrorist activities after their 
release from Guantánamo; the list contained only 
12 names, an overall recidivism rate of just 2 per-
cent.¹²¹ Although some former detainees may have 
aﬃ  liated with terrorist organizations after their 
release from Guantánamo, actual recidivism rates 
appear to be low. And an eﬀ ective reintegration 
program will further reduce the risk of recidivism 
as former detainees are supported to reestablish 
and maintain productive lives.
 Th e UC Berkeley Detainee Study reported 
that among its sample of 62 former released 
detainees, many had negative feelings against the 
United States as a result of their experience in 
Guantánamo. In the UC Berkeley Detainee Study, 
31 of the respondents said their opinion of the 
United States changed from positive to negative 
as a result of their experiences in U.S. custody.¹²² 
Yet many of those who held strong negative views 
about the United States also aﬃ  rmed their desire 
to address their concerns peacefully.¹²³ In fact, sev-
eral released detainees stated they wished to assure 
the American people that they harbored no ill will 
toward them.¹²⁴
 An eﬀ ective reintegration policy could mitigate 
the negative views that released detainees hold 
toward the United States and prevent released 
detainees from taking up arms against it. At pres-
ent, Saudi Arabia is the only country with a com-
prehensive reintegration program for released 
Guantánamo detainees. Th is program includes 
religious reeducation taught by Islamic clerics; 
time in a halfway house where the former detain-
ees receive religious and psychological counseling 
and can engage in recreational activities; help with 
marriage and resettlement into Saudi society; and 
ﬁ nancial support and job assistance.¹²⁵
 Until recently, Saudi Arabia claimed that 
no former detainees had “relapsed” into terror-
ism after completing its program.¹²⁶ In January 
2009, however, Saudi oﬃ  cials announced that 
11 former detainees who had been released from 
Guantánamo and participated in the program are 
now believed to have ﬂ ed Saudi Arabia and joined 
terrorist groups abroad, although the details of all 
cases were not made public.¹²⁷
 An independent evaluation of the Saudi reha-
bilitation program is necessary to gain a full under-
standing of its eﬃ  cacy. Reintegration programs 
should include safeguards to monitor former 
detainees after release and reduce the risk that for-
mer detainees will take up arms against the United 
States or its allies. Nevertheless, a comprehensive 
reintegration program could help reduce the risk 
of former detainees becoming radicalized by giving 
them support to address their economic troubles, 
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isolation from social stigma, and mental and physi-
cal health problems.
BUILDING NEW STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
A U.S.-supported eﬀ ort to establish reintegration 
programs in former detainees’ home countries will 
also help strengthen diplomatic, military, and intel-
ligence alliances with those countries. In this man-
ner, reintegration programs will serve as a dramatic 
paradigm shift in the U.S. approach to combating 
terrorism worldwide—a move from unilateral-
ism to greater multilateralism, from antagonism 
and strained allegiances to genuine partnerships. 
Such a paradigm shift is in the interest not just of 
the United States, but also of the released detain-
ees’ home countries, many of which face internal 
threats from terrorist groups.
 Islamic extremist groups have used Guantánamo 
as a propaganda and recruitment tool to great 
eﬀ ect. Evidence suggests that such eﬀ orts are dis-
tressingly common: researchers at West Point’s 
Combating Terrorism Center have found scores 
of references by top Al Qaeda oﬃ  cials referencing 
Guantánamo, from as early as 2002 and as recently 
as January 2008.¹²⁸ Osama bin Laden, for instance, 
has referenced Guantánamo a number of times in 
his widely disseminated tape recordings, and has 
expressed outrage at “the atrocities and crimes in 
the prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo.”¹²⁹
 Such propaganda eﬀ orts have worried govern-
ment oﬃ  cials worldwide. Many U.S. oﬃ  cials fear 
the stain of Guantánamo has become a tool for cre-
ating more terrorists. “It is a rallying cry for terrorist 
recruitment and harmful to our national security, 
so closing it is important for our national security,” 
Admiral Blair said in a recent statement before the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.¹³⁰ Brit-
ain’s Lord Chancellor Charles Falconer and Ernst 
Uhrlau, president of Germany’s federal intelligence 
service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), have 
also denounced the detention facility’s propaganda 
value for terrorist groups.¹³¹ 
 Comprehensive reintegration programs would 
frustrate eﬀ orts of terrorists to use Guantánamo 
as a propaganda and recruitment tool. Localized, 
country-speciﬁ c reintegration assistance for former 
detainees would drain such propaganda of much 
of its rhetorical power by demonstrating that the 
United States and the receiving country were work-
ing together to help former detainees rebuild their 
lives.
 Further, U.S.-supported reintegration programs 
could also help quell religious extremist move-
ments in the home countries of released detainees. 
Th e United States could condition reintegration 
aid on the establishment of local and moderate 
religious reeducation programs, partially mod-
eled on the Saudi program.¹³² Th e goal of such 
reeducation programs is to eﬀ ectively instill the 
idea that “Islamic tenets [have] been perverted by 
Bin Laden and other terrorists,” and that those 
terrorists are “gang leaders, not true Muslims.”¹³³ 
U.S.-supported reintegration programs could thus 
provide a new approach in the struggle against
violent extremism—an approach based on cooper-
ation and local mores, and rooted in the core tenets 
of Islam.
 Finally, a comprehensive resettlement and rein-
tegration program constitutes a humanitarian 
response to years of conﬁ nement of former detain-
ees in U.S. custody. However, such a program may 
also become part of a broader set of corrective
measures to remedy the eﬀ ects of detention, 
including providing compensation and issuing an 
apology or other acknowledgment of harm. Th e 
U.S. government employed this means of correc-
tion when it issued a letter of apology with repara-
tions in 1993 to the Japanese-American survivors 
of domestic internment camps during World War 
II.¹³⁴ A reintegration program would support
additional eﬀ orts to address the eﬀ ects of detention 
on former Guantánamo detainees.
Proposal & Recommendations
We propose the establishment of comprehensive, 
locally-tailored resettlement and reintegration pro-
grams that would include interventions to address 
social stigma, job training, and medical and psycho-
logical services. Such an initiative could be imple-
mented in a number of ways, including executive 
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order, legislation, or an independent nonpartisan 
commission. 
REDUCE STIGMA
Social stigma should be addressed early in the rein-
tegration process.¹³⁵ Removing stigma will help 
former detainees rebuild social networks, con-
strain deviant behavior, and reconnect with their 
communities.¹³⁶ In addition to fostering stronger 
mental health, belonging to a solid social network 
also helps individuals secure employment.¹³⁷
 A reintegration program must be tailored to 
country-speciﬁ c conditions, as the intensity of 
stigmatization will vary depending in part on the 
particular social context.¹³⁸ For example, creat-
ing opportunities for members of a community to 
hear from and interact with former Guantánamo 
detainees may occur in myriad ways—through the 
media, cultural ceremonies, town-hall events, or 
some other forum. Social stigma associated with 
Guantánamo can also be lessened with public
education conducted by local NGOs, local govern-
ments, or religious and other respected leaders in 
the community. 
 Finally, released Guantánamo detainees would 
beneﬁ t from formal recognition that they do not 
pose a risk to society. In addition, a case-by-case 
process for obtaining oﬃ  cial recognition of their 
innocence should also be made available. Th is 
would enable former detainees to clear their names 
and “rewrite” their past, and also encourage com-
munity members to work with released detainees 
to reintegrate them into society.¹³⁹
ADDRESS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
A reintegration program should support both the 
immediate and longer-term social and economic 
inclusion of former Guantánamo detainees into 
their communities, and can begin even during 
detention to ensure a smooth transition to civil 
society. External assistance is necessary to help the 
released detainees secure long-term, stable employ-
ment, which provides a steady income and a sense 
of structure and responsibility. 
 Released Guantánamo detainees would greatly 
beneﬁ t from an eﬀ ective economic reintegration 
plan that targets the needs of individuals and is 
appropriate to the job markets in which former 
detainees resettle. Job-creation programs, such as 
small- and medium-scale enterprise development 
initiatives, should be a key part of the program. A 
microﬁ nance model could be particularly eﬀ ective 
for former Guantánamo detainees who struggle 
with debt, and for those who were previously self-
employed and now need assistance to rebuild their 
businesses. Such support would provide released 
detainees an opportunity to ﬁ nd their own
solutions to the economic challenges they face, and 
thus give them a sense of autonomy and owner-
ship in their reintegration. Economic reintegration 
should be coordinated with local groups. Commu-
nity-based organizations could initiate job transi-
tion and placement programs, and microﬁ nance 
assistance for released Guantánamo detainees. 
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH
A reintegration program should support both 
the immediate and longer-term psychological 
and physical health needs of former Guantánamo 
detainees. It is important to ensure that released 
Guantánamo detainees have access to medical care 
appropriate to the unique circumstances of their 
conﬁ nement and release without conviction of a 
crime. Again, this aspect of reintegration assistance 
should be provided through local health care pro-
viders who are attuned to the cultural and social 
circumstances of the population and are able to 
tailor service delivery appropriately.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Partnership with local religious and civic organi-
zations in designing and implementing reintegra-
tion programs should be considered so that service 
provision is conducted in a culturally-appropriate 
manner.¹⁴⁰
 Th e role that the United States should play in 
designing and implementing reintegration pro-
grams must be carefully considered. While the 
U.S. government should develop a comprehensive 
resettlement and reintegration policy overseen by 
a high-level State Department oﬃ  cial, such as the 
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under secretary for democracy and global aﬀ airs, it 
may be appropriate for the United States to support 
in-country implementation through local indepen-
dent nongovernmental organizations. Such assis-
tance could be administered by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID). Finally, 
there should be an eﬀ ective oversight mechanism 
to ensure that the programs are transparent and 
accountable and administered eﬃ  ciently.
WE PROPOSE THAT THE UNITED STATES:
» Design a resettlement and reintegration policy to 
minimize the social stigma experienced by former 
Guantánamo detainees. A case-by-case process 
should be implemented to enable former detain-
ees to clear their names and encourage commu-
nity members to assist released detainees as they 
reintegrate into their communities.
» Provide released detainees with immediate 
short-term ﬁ nancial assistance and support 
for sustainable livelihoods. A comprehensive
reintegration program should provide imme-
diate assistance, as well as support detainees 
to secure sustainable employment and income 
for the long-term. Preparation for re-entry into 
the job market should begin before release. Job 
training and job-creation programs, such as 
small- and medium-scale enterprise develop-
ment initiatives, also should be a key part of the 
program and targeted to the local labor markets. 
Such support should aﬀ ord released detainees 
an opportunity to craft their own solutions to 
overcome the economic challenges they face, 
and give them a sense of autonomy and owner-
ship in their reintegration.
» Support the provision of mental and physical 
health services for released detainees who seek such
assistance. Th ese services should be oﬀ ered in 
conjunction with other reintegration services, 
such as job training and family support. Th is
integrated approach should address the relation-
ship of economic hardships and mental health 
problems. 
» Ensure that reintegration programs are devel-
oped and implemented in partnership with local 
communities. Local religious and civic organi-
zations should be involved in the design and 
implementation of reintegration programs to se-
cure the legitimacy of reintegration eﬀ orts in the 
home countries of former detainees. Th e U.S. 
government should develop a comprehensive re-
settlement and reintegration policy overseen by a 
high-level State Department oﬃ  cial. However, it 
may be appropriate for the United States to sup-
port in-country implementation through local 
independent nongovernmental organizations, 
with appropriate monitoring and oversight.
Conclusion
Th e details of a U.S.-backed reintegration scheme 
remain to be worked out; we simply do not know 
enough about the released detainees as a group to 
make more speciﬁ c recommendations. However, 
the known problems faced by released detainees 
are compelling and call for intervention. As one for-
mer detainee put it: “We can’t go immediately from 
getting oﬀ  a plane from Cuba to living in society. 
Everything has changed.”¹⁴¹
 Th ese men, scattered across the globe, need 
assistance. Th e United States has a strategic and 
moral imperative to facilitate their resettlement 
and reintegration. A U.S.-supported reintegration 
plan for former Guantánamo detainees would be a 
wise ﬁ rst step.
CONCLUSION
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